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In a globalised world structural change is essential if
countries want to preserve their competitive edge
and reduce their unemployment.A major obstacle to
structural change is employment protection. Ac-
cording to the OECD, the summary indicator of the
strictness of employment protection (EPL) is rela-
tively high in continental European countries with
the exception of Switzerland and Denmark, and rel-
atively low in English-speaking countries.
A reduction in the strictness of EPL, which would
increase the flexibility of labour markets, is general-
ly resisted by incumbent workers. In order to over-
come this resistance, the European Commission has
proposed enhancing income security by providing
higher unemployment benefits. According to this
“flexicurity” strategy, flexibility is supported by gen-
erous income security. Workers will accept a reduc-
tion in the strictness of EPL more easily if they
receive higher unemployment benefits during peri-
ods of unemployment.
As the “flexicurity” strategy is very popular in
Europe (European Commission 2006,chapter 2) it is
of interest to know whether the generosity of unem-
ployment benefits has been associated with less
employment protection in OECD countries in the
past.There are few studies which have analysed this
relationship empirically. Boeri et al. (2003 and 2006)
investigate the relationship between the generosity
of unemployment benefits and the level of EPL
strictness. In a cross-section for one year they find a
negative relation between the two schemes.
Our approach is different. We want to find out
whether changes in the strictness of EPL over time
can be explained by changes in the generosity of
unemployment benefits.We include 26 OECD coun-
tries and consider the period from 1985 to 2003.
Apart from the generosity of unemployment bene-
fits we also control for other determinants. They
relate to the activation of the unemployed, the
power of unions, the strength of government, trust
and unemployment.
During the last two decades some European coun-
tries have reduced the strictness of their EPL.
Governments,however,have pursued a highly selec-
tive approach.They have left existing provisions for
permanent contracts practically unaltered (with the
exception of Spain) and relaxed only EPL for tem-
porary jobs (Figure). However, the latter reforms
have not been implemented in all OECD countries
but only in some countries. These countries are
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands and Sweden. In these countries firms’
use of temporary forms of employment has been
eased considerably. The most prevalent path of
reform involved facilitating the use of fixed-term
contracts and/or hiring workers from temporary
work agencies.
Determinants of employment protection
According to the literature, interest groups, politi-
cians (including the government), political institu-
tions and social values have to be taken into account
when analysing the political economy of EPL
reforms. In the following we shall discuss some key
ideas from the literature. As we will show, the pre-
dictions found in the literature on the determinants
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We will focus on the political power of incumbent
employees to resist EPL reforms,the counterbalanc-
ing factors of compensating transfers and of a strong
government, and the role of trust in implementing
EPL reforms.
The main interest group relevant for EPL reforms
are the incumbent employees and their unions who
want to protect their jobs by a strict EPL.When the
amount of rents – i.e. the difference between the
employees wage and the unemployment benefits an
individual would receive if unemployed – is high,
workers will organize themselves better and are
more determined to oppose EPL reforms. While
workers fear being negatively affected by a reduc-
tion in the strictness of employment protection, the
unemployed stand to benefit. Their chances of find-
ing a job would increase. But workers have a higher
propensity to dominate political decisions. They are
politically better organized than
the unemployed (Fernandez and
Rodrik 1992, 1146).
We hypothesize that the resis-
tance of incumbent workers to
EPL reforms will be higher for
EPL reforms for permanent jobs
and lower for EPL reforms for
temporary jobs (“reforms at the
margin”).This is because incum-
bent workers are not directly af-
fected by the latter reforms, and
potentially they are made better
off. They can earn higher wages
because labour market tightness
increases due to the higher de-
mand for temporary jobs.And if
they lose their job they will bene-
fit from the increased job finding
opportunities of the unemployed
(Saint-Paul 2000, 227–53). The
resistance to EPL reforms at the
margin will, however, not be
negligible. Incumbent workers
may recognise that two-tier sys-
tems could perhaps be used as
an intermediate step towards a
complete EPL reform that they
are not in favour of. Reforms at
the margin gradually build up a
stock of workers with temporary
contracts. These workers have
different interests than those who hold a fixed con-
tract. They can be used as a “political constituency”
to support subsequent reforms of core labour mar-
ket EPL that the government from the beginning
may have intended to achieve (Saint-Paul 1996,
chapter 11; Dewatripont and Roland 1992). The
power of incumbent workers and their unions to
resist EPL reforms cannot be easily measured. In
this article we use union density as a proxy.
Policy-makers in favour of lower EPL strictness can
overcome insider resistance to EPL reforms by
offering compensating transfers to those who do not
benefit from the reform. Lower dismissal protection
may be less worrying to insiders if unemployment
benefits become more generous. Activating the
unemployed, which increases their re-employment
chances, may also reduce the resistance of incum-
bent workers to EPL reforms. According to Roland
(2002), governments should follow a long-term reli-
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able policy of providing compensating transfers in
order to be able to secure the political acceptance of
EPL reforms by the losers. In this paper we measure
the compensating transfers by the generosity of
unemployment benefits. We use expenditure on
active labour market policies as an indicator for the
activation of the unemployed.
The stronger a government the easier it is for the gov-
ernment to implement policy change.Strength of gov-
ernment is related to the number of independent
branches of government (executive and legislative
branches), the party composition of these branches,
the role of the “judiciary”and “sub-federal entities”as
players in the political system, etc. If the characteris-
tics of the political system constrain the commitment
of government to political change – as indicated by
our “Political Constraints Index” – it will be difficult
for governments to overcome resistance of incumbent
workers to EPL. Broad coalition governments, for
example, are considered to be an obstacle to EPL
reform.They tend to paralyse decision-making,due to
the hold-up power of the workers’ wings in the Social
Democratic parties (Alesina and Drazen 1992).
So far the literature – as summarized above – has
overlooked that the power of incumbent workers
and the strength of government may be determined
by more fundamental factors, like the prevailing
social values. In recent studies the importance of
trust has been addressed in this context (see, for
example,Algan and Cahuc 2006).Trust (“can people
be trusted?”), however, is a general category. It may
refer to different groups of persons. With respect to
the power of employees, trust can be associated with
positive attitudes towards social co-operation.
Strong trust may help to overcome collective action
problems, thereby sustaining labour unions and fos-
tering resistance to EPL reforms. With respect to
workers’ perception of employers, trust may lead to
a different form of behaviour. If workers think that
they are treated fairly by employers, they are less
likely to demand employment protection.And if the
people trust politicians, governments are in a stron-
ger position to implement EPL reforms.
Finally EPL reforms might be influenced by the
development of unemployment.A rise in unemploy-
ment may result in incumbent workers being more
determined to protect their jobs. The unemployed,
however, will be more strongly in favour of EPL
reforms, which might create more employment
opportunities for them. And governments may
become more committed to increasing labour mar-
ket flexibility.
As we have shown,the theoretical arguments do not
give clear guidance on the effects of our determi-
nants on changes in employment protection.
Empirical research can,however,help to identify the
driving forces of EPL reforms.
Data
Our dependent variables are the OECD summary
indicators of EPL strictness for the period 1985 to
2003. We use three indicators: the overall EPL indi-
cator (version 1), the EPL indicator for regular
employment and the EPL indicator for temporary
employment (OECD 2004, chapter 2).
The determinants of EPL are from different sources:
• The union density data are from the OECD
(Union Density Database) and Visser (2006).The
“adjusted” union membership data define union
membership as a proportion of wage and salary
earners in employment.
• Unemployment benefits are taken from the
OECD.The OECD summary measure of benefit
entitlements is defined as the average of the gross
unemployment benefit replacement rates for two
earnings levels, three family situations and three
durations of unemployment (OECD Tax-Benefit
Models).
• Public expenditure for active labour market poli-
cy as a percentage of GDP (OECD Labour Mar-
ket Database) is used as a proxy for the activation
of the unemployed.The purpose of active labour
market policies is to provide active assistance to
the unemployed,which will improve their chances
of obtaining work. This indicator, however, does
not capture all aspects of activation like coun-
selling, placement of the unemployed, benefit
sanctions, etc. Unfortunately other panel data are
not available.
• As our measure of the constraints on policy
change that governments are facing we use the
“Policy Constraints Index V” of Henisz (2000)
and Wharton School (2006). It measures the
extent to which a change in the preferences of any
one actor of the political system leads to a change
in government policy.
• The indicator “trust” is taken from the World
Values Survey. It refers to the percentage of thepopulation that thinks most
people can be trusted. The
following question was asked:
“Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can
be trusted or that you need to
be very careful in dealing
with people?”
• Unemployment is measured
by the standardised unem-
ployment rate as a percent-
age of the total labour force
(OECD 2007).
Estimation approach
Our panel of countries allows us
to estimate a model with coun-
try and year fixed effects. One
advantage of including country
fixed effects is that they control
for unobserved country specific
variables that are constant over time and influence
both employment protection and our explanatory
variables. In particular, without these country indi-
cators one may not discover that higher benefits are
associated with less protection. This is because
unobserved variables such as the political prefer-
ences of voters may lead to both higher benefits and
high protection. Unobserved or unmeasured left-
leaning preferences of voters may make it appear
that high benefits are associated with high protec-
tion.Country fixed effects control for these political
preferences of voters. They control for the average
level of protection and benefits and allow for an
examination of the effect of changes in benefits on
changes in protection.
Thus we estimate the following equation:
where µi is a country fixed effect and γt a year fixed
effect. We estimate this model for three different
measures of employment protection legislation yit.
The xit vector includes the generosity of unemploy-
ment benefits, public expenditure for active labour
market policies,union density,policy constraints and
a measure of trust and unemployment. We put the
unemployment benefits measurement in logs
because we expect that the effect of benefits on
employment protection legislation is declining at the
margin.We cluster all standard errors by country.
Results
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for the data.
We use in our analysis bi-annual data over the peri-
od 1985 to 2003.The overall employment protection
index ranges from 0.21 (United States over the
entire time period) to 4.19 (Portugal in the late
1980s). The protection indices for temporary work
and regular work show similar ranges. They range
from 0.25 in the United States, Ireland and the UK
to 5.38 in Italy for temporary employment and from
0.17 (United States) to 5.00 (Portugal) for regular
employment. The average EPL index is slightly
lower for temporary work than the one for regular
work. The summary measure of the unemployment
benefits, which is defined as the gross replacement
rate, has a mean of 29 percent. It ranges from 3 per-
cent in Italy (1989) to 65 percent in Denmark.There
are pronounced differences in trust.In Portugal only
9.8 percent of the population trusted other persons,
whereas in Norway a high of 64.8 percent trust each
other. The lowest unemployment rate was achieved
in Sweden (1.6 percent), the highest in Poland (19.6
percent). The Political Constraints Index V ranges
from a minimum of 0.33 in Italy to a maximum of
0.89 in Belgium. Whereas the United States only
spent 0.12 percent of GDP on active labour market
policy, Sweden reached the maximum with 2.83 per-
cent. Union density was lowest in France (8.1 per-
cent) and highest in Sweden (83.9 percent).











Overall EPL (score) 215 2.11 1.058 0.21 4.19
EPL for temporary 
employment (score) 215 2.09 1.476 0.25 5.38
EPL for regular 




215 28.8 12.918 3.0 65.0
Log of OECD summary 
measure of unemploy-
ment-benefits
215 3.23 0.551 1.10 4.17
Trust (%) 135 38.5 14.188 9.8 64.8
Unemployment (%) 206 7.7 3.753 1.6 19.6
Policy Constraints
Index V (score) 213 0.77 0.093 0.33 0.89
Public expenditure for
active labour market
policy (% of GDP)
208 0.79 0.501 0.12 2.83
Union density (%) 186 38.3 21.228 8.1 83.9
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Next we move to our estimation results.The depen-
dent variable in Table 2 is the overall employment
protection index. The point estimate on the unem-
ployment benefits measure is negative and statisti-
cally significant in three of the five specifications.We
also estimated these regressions without country
fixed effects (not reported). We found that in the
regressions that do not include country fixed effects
the unemployment benefits measure has a positive
sign.The fact that the inclusion of country indicators
changes the sign on the unemployment benefits
measure from positive to negative, shows that there
are country-specific variables which cause some
countries to have above average rates of both unem-
ployment benefits and employment protection and
others below average rates.
In Table 2, the estimates on the unemployment benefit
measure imply that a one percent increase in benefits
leads to an increase of between 0.0018 and 0.0028
points in the employment protection measure. An
alternative interpretation is that (given the mean
Table 2 
Determinants of overall EPL 
-0.233 -0.280** – 0.187** – 0.181 – 0.203** Log of OECD summary measure of
unemployment-benefits (0.140) (0.101) (0.086) (0.111) (0.097)
– 0.020** – 0.020*** – 0.021*** – 0.020***
Trust (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
– 0.029 – 0.03 – 0.03
Unemployment (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
1.517*** 1.537*** 1.722***
Policy Constraints Index V (0.217) (0.246) (0.275)
0.035 0.114 Public expenditure for active labour
market policy (% of GDP) (0.142) (0.164)
– 0.015
Union density (0.014)
3.023*** 3.642*** 2.557*** 2.524*** 2.642***
Constant (0.428) (0.426) (0.402) (0.500) (0.561)
Observations 215 135 132 130 114
R
2 0.9497 0.9594 0.9653 0.9652 0.9666
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * means significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1%
level. Year and country effects included but not reported.
Table 3 
Determinants of EPL for temporary employment
-0.409 – 0.571** – 0.365* – 0.328 – 0.378 Log of OECD summary measure of
unemployment-benefits (0.331) (0.241) (0.213) (0.268) (0.228)
– 0.037** – 0.038*** – 0.039*** – 0.040***
Trust (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
– 0.062 – 0.065 – 0.079*
Unemployment (0.040) (0.042) (0.044)
3.316*** 3.390*** 3.463***
Policy Constraints Index V (0.480) (0.553) (0.561)
0.104 0.126 Public expenditure for active labour
market policy (% of GDP) (0.288) (0.325)
0.013
Union density (0.026)
3.650*** 5.104*** 2.673** 2.471* 2.861*
Constant (1.022) (0.909) (0.996) (1.217) (0.993)
Observations 215 135 132 130 114
R
2 0.9088 0.9186 0.9325 0.9301 0.9395
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * means significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1%
level. Year and country effects included but not reported.employment protection measure is 2.11) a one point
increase in the benefits leads to a 0.09 and 0.13 point
increase in employment protection.These findings sug-
gest that,quantitatively,the correlation between unem-
ployment benefits and employment protection is weak.
Among our other control variables only trust and
policy constraints are statistically significant. All
specifications in Table 2 show that higher levels of
trust lead to less employment protection and that
this effect is statistically significant at conventional
levels.This suggests that trust is a substitute for reg-
ulation. One possible interpretation of this finding is
that when workers trust that they are treated fairly
by employers,they are less likely to demand employ-
ment protection.Another interpretation is that when
workers trust politicians and believe in their ability
to take care of them it will be easier for governments
to convince workers about the necessity of reducing
the strictness of EPL.We also find that fewer policy
constraints are negatively correlated with employ-
ment protection. This suggests that countries with
governments that are less subject to checks and bal-
ances and that are not paralysed by conflicting par-
ties in coalition governments are more likely to soft-
en employment protection. Our results do not indi-
cate any significant influence of unemployment,
public expenditure on active labour market policy
and union density on employment protection.
Table 3 uses employment protection for temporary
work as the dependent variable. Here the coeffi-
cients on the measure of unemployment benefits,
trust and policy constraints almost double in size,
and the point estimates that were statistically signif-
icant in Table 2 remain so in Table 3. These results
show that providing higher unemployment benefits,
a higher level of trust and low policy constraints are
especially beneficial for implementing EPL reforms
at the margin. Higher unemployment benefits may
increase the support of their recipients. In addition
providing compensation transfers seems to be quite
effective in overcoming incumbent workers’ resis-
tance to EPL reforms of temporary work. This may
be so because liberalising temporary work is con-
fronted with less resistance from insiders than the
reduction in the strictness of EPL for regular work.
Trust too has a positive impact.And for governments
that are facing policy constraints, it is easier to over-
come the resistance to EPL reforms at the margin.
In contrast to Table 3, Table 4 shows that our time-
varying covariates do a poor job explaining employ-
ment protection for regular work. In part this is the
case because there is less variation in the regular
work employment protection measure within a
country,than for the temporary work measure.Many
countries have lowered employment protection for
temporary work while implementing few changes for
permanent work. However, it may also reflect the
possibility that policy makers are more willing to
increase unemployment benefits in exchange for less
protection for temporary work, but not for regular
work. The results of Table 4 imply that our findings
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Table 4 
Determinants of EPL for regular employment
– 0.063 0.003 – 0.017 – 0.043 – 0.034 Log of OECD summary measure of
unemployment-benefits (0.081) (0.050) (0.062) (0.078) (0.067)
-0.002 – 0.003 – 0.003 0.0002
Trust (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
0.003 0.005 0.02
Unemployment (0.013) (0.013) (0.019)
– 0.289 – 0.326 – 0.025
Policy Constraints Index V (0.287) (0.308) (0.274)
– 0.039 0.099 Public expenditure for active labour
market policy (% of GDP) (0.073) (0.101)
– 0.044
Union density (0.026)
2.412*** 2.198*** 2.462*** 2.602*** 3.460***
Constant (0.262) (0.207) (0.412) (0.484) (0.985)
Observations 215 135 132 130 114
R
2 0.9707 0.9727 0.9725 0.9727 0.973
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * means significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1%
level. Year and country effects included but not reported.CESifo DICE Report 4/2008 35
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in Table 2 are due to the fact that two-tier reforms of
EPL have taken place in Europe as shown by the
results of Table 3.
Conclusion
Our analysis has shown that changes in the strictness
of EPL over time can be explained by the generosity
of unemployment benefits. Lower dismissal protec-
tion seems to be less worrying to workers if unem-
ployment benefits become more generous. This result
is in line with previous empirical research. In addi-
tion, our disaggregated analysis has shown that this
effect is mainly driven by the temporary component
of employment protection. While we find significant
effects of unemployment benefits on temporary
employment protection, we were not able to detect
such effects for permanent contracts.This implies that
generous employment benefits reduce the resistance
to EPL reforms only “at the margin”.
Generosity of unemployment benefits, however, is
not the only determinant of reducing EPL strictness.
Our analysis has revealed that a high level of trust
and low policy constraints have also been beneficial
for implementing EPL reforms in OECD countries.
Thus, generous unemployment benefits in combina-
tion with a high level of trust and low policy con-
straints can explain the liberalisation process of tem-
porary work in OECD countries.
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